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Expectant Futures and an Early Diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease: Knowing and its 1 
consequences 2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
 5 
Efforts to diagnose Alzheimer's disease (AD) at earlier stages as a means to managing the 6 
risks of an ageing population, dominate scientific research and healthcare policy in the UK. It 7 
is anticipated that early diagnosis will maximise treatment options and enable patients to 8 
'prepare for their future' in terms of care. Drawing on qualitative data gathered across an out-9 
patient memory service and in-patient hospital in the UK, the purpose of this paper is to 10 
examine the ways in which the hopeful promissory claims of early diagnosis as it maintains 11 
the dominant biomedical model for managing AD, are negotiated by healthcare practitioners. 12 
Developing the analytical standpoint of the sociology of expectations, this paper 13 
demonstrates that early diagnosis has the potential to ‘close off’ hopeful promissory visions 14 
of the future in two ways. Firstly, it (re)produces the fearful anticipations of AD built around 15 
expectations concerning the ageing future ‘self’, and secondly it produces uncertainty in 16 
terms of the availability of care as material resource. Whilst practitioners account for the 17 
uncertainties and anxieties it produces for patients and their families, they also convey a 18 
sense of ambivalence concerning early diagnosis. This article captures the internal conflicts 19 
and contradictions inherent to practitioners’ perspectives regarding the repercussions of early 20 
diagnosis and concludes by arguing that it effaces the uncertainties and anxieties that it 21 
produces in practice as it restricts the co-existence of narratives for making sense of memory 22 
loss beyond ‘loss of self’, and fails to recognise care as a viable alternative for managing AD.  23 
 24 
 25 
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Keywords 26 
 27 
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 29 
Highlights 30 
Early diagnosis is privileged in healthcare policy. 31 
Diagnosing Alzheimer’s disease is complex and entangled in fear and anxiety. 32 
Early diagnosis (re)produces patients’ ‘low’ expectations of the disease. 33 
The research illustrates practitioners’ anxieties concerning future healthcare. 34 
Practitioners convey their ambivalence around practising early diagnosis. 35 
 36 
Introduction 37 
 38 
Efforts to improve the detection of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and increase diagnosis rates 39 
particularly at earlier stages to manage the ‘impending burden’ of an ‘ageing population’, 40 
drives current UK healthcare policy initiatives and scientific agendas (Lock 2013: 22). 41 
According to Golomb et al., (2004), ‘explosion of interest [in AD] reflects a shift in dementia 42 
research away from established disease and toward early diagnosis’ (pp. 353). Scientific 43 
research is currently dominated by efforts to detect biomarkers, the earliest physical signs of 44 
the disease (see Zetterberg 2011) and since age is the greatest risk factor for developing AD, 45 
healthcare policy initiatives have also emerged in recent years, which seek to improve 46 
diagnosis rates in the older population. Such initiatives implemented in the National Health 47 
Service (NHS) include pay-for-performance schemes such as the GP Quality Outcomes 48 
Framework (QOF) and the National Dementia Commissioning for Quality and Innovation 49 
(CQUIN) Framework.  
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 3
In the drive towards early diagnosis to manage the risks of an ageing population, the 51 
development of new techniques and technologies to identify genetic risk factors and detect 52 
biomarkers, reflects a larger transition in contemporary biomedicine which Clarke et al., 53 
(2003) describe as biomedicalisation. ‘Increasingly complex, multisited, multidirectional 54 
processes of medicalization that today are being extended and reconstituted through the 55 
emergent social forms and practices of a highly and increasingly technoscientific 56 
biomedicine’ altering individuals’ experiences of ‘illness’ in a myriad of complex ways 57 
(Clarke et al., 2010: 47). With respect to ageing, developments in biomedicine as situated 58 
within a capitalist framework more generally, also affect how we conceive the nature of 59 
‘growing old’, primarily as a process amenable to the efforts in medicine to ensure a 60 
successful ageing process. ‘Medical interventions are reshaping norms of ageing and standard 61 
clinical practice’ (Kaufman et al., 2004: 732) with normal ageing processes recast as 62 
biomedical concerns (Estes and Binney 1989): biomedical sciences shape the knowledge and 63 
expectations of the aged body. With respect to AD, efforts to detect the condition at earlier 64 
stages and control the number of individuals ‘at risk’ of developing the disease ensure that 65 
ways of approaching and managing the condition remain primarily within a biomedical 66 
framework (see Lock 2013).  67 
 68 
As a result of the political and scientific focus and government funding towards determining 69 
cause, cure and prevention of AD, care (with respect to non-biomedical intervention in 70 
healthcare practice), as an alternative for managing AD has been relatively overlooked (Lock 71 
2013). In the UK context, the publically funded NHS in recent years has faced (and continues 72 
to face) financial cuts with the majority of NHS trusts experiencing rising debt. Social care in 73 
the UK has also seen a marked decline in terms of funding with detrimental consequences for 74 
adequately meeting the needs of the older population(s) (see Kings Fund and Nuffield Trust 75 
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2016). The curative model for managing AD as it sustains the hegemony of the biomedical 76 
framework both impacts individuals’ experiences of ageing and memory loss and has also led 77 
to a marked decline in the funding of basic care services.  78 
 79 
The complexities of early diagnosis 80 
 81 
Despite the focus in research and policy on detecting AD at earlier stages, early diagnosis is a 82 
contested issue in part because the condition is nosologically contested. AD is an elusive 83 
phenomenon and the diagnosis process is a complex endeavour; symptoms associated with 84 
cognitive decline are difficult to separate from those of normal ageing processes and there 85 
remains no cure or adequate treatment options (see Gubrium 1986; Lock, 2013). Due to the 86 
complexity of AD’s aetiology, Lock (2013) is especially critical of increased efforts in 87 
biomedicine to prevent AD and establish early diagnosis. Prevention strategies in research are 88 
grounded on the conception that they will lead to an improved understanding of AD’s 89 
aetiology. Yet as Lock shows, despite increased attention in research and policy on disease 90 
prevention, uncertainty around aetiology prevails. 91 
 92 
Early diagnosis is further contested as it raises questions around for whom exactly it is better 93 
to know. The hopeful discourse around early diagnosis highlights the importance of enabling 94 
individuals to plan and prepare for their future. For example, proceeding with care 95 
arrangements and seeking advice regarding power of attorney or a living will (see Boenink, 96 
Van Lente & Moors 2016). Yet, it is questionable as to whether this process is helpful for 97 
individuals experiencing memory problems (Boenink, Van Lente & Moors 2016; Whitehouse 98 
2016) since it has the potential to produce affective consequences for patients and their 99 
families built around particular expectations of a diagnosis of AD. I refer here to the affective 100 
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and emotional consequences of early diagnosis in terms of the anxieties and anticipations that 101 
it produces without confining analysis to a particular theoretical approach on affect and care. 102 
The disease remains highly stigmatised and feared and whilst the hopeful discourse around 103 
diagnosing AD in terms of enabling people to prepare for their future is promoted through 104 
popular culture and media discourse, ‘contemporary public perceptions and media portrayals 105 
of Alzheimer’s are almost exclusively pejorative’ (Beard and Neary 2013: 12). Moreover, as 106 
the management of Alzheimer’s disease remains primarily within biomedical frameworks and 107 
given the biomedicalisation of memory loss to include earlier stages (reconfiguring the 108 
boundaries of normality) this, ‘lead[s] to stigmatisation as the condition is assumed to be a 109 
death sentence’ (Beard and Neary 2013: 131). It reinforces the importance ascribed to 110 
cognition and rational thinking and the boundaries between successful and unsuccessful 111 
ageing are (re)cast as biomedical concerns (Estes and Binney 1989; Beard and Neary 2013). 112 
Constructions and constitutions of a diagnosis of AD, with respect to loss of self, the abject 113 
other and hopelessness for the future, suffuse patients’ and practitioners’ accounts of the 114 
difficulties associated with diagnosing the condition (see Aquilina and Hughes 2006; Beard 115 
and Neary 2013; Taylor 2010). Expectations of the nature of growing older and the ‘senile 116 
other’ further dominate accounts (Isaacs 1972). 117 
 118 
Overall, a diagnosis of AD sustains the privileging of biomedical intervention for managing 119 
the condition and effaces the affective, sociocultural dimensions of living with a diagnosis of 120 
AD, and experiential changes occurring in individuals (see Voris, Shabahangi and Fox 2009). 121 
The prevailing biomedical model restricts the co-existence of other narratives for making 122 
sense of AD and fails to recognise care as a viable alternative for managing the disease 123 
(Chaufan, Hollister and Fox 2012; Cuijpers, Lente, Boenink and Moors 2014; Cuijpers and 124 
Lente 2015). Furthermore, despite research, which shows that practitioners articulate the 125 
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importance of a caring model for managing AD, this approach is difficult to uphold (Apesoa-126 
Varano, Barker and Hinton 2011). As physicians attempt to manage the ‘symbolic power of 127 
cure’ more generally with respect to dementia, care remains a ‘secondary and temporary’ 128 
articulation (pp. 1469). Given the limited treatment and care options and no cure for the 129 
condition, the hegemony of the biomedical model as it drives early diagnosis, further 130 
increases the uncertainties and anxieties felt by patients and their families (Lock 2013).  131 
 132 
It is therefore well established that early diagnosis is contested and entangled in a wider 133 
discourse of cure versus care. Yet, exactly how practitioners account for and negotiate the 134 
potential repercussions of early diagnosis with respect to both the complexity of expectations 135 
and anxieties concerning diagnosis, and the underfunding of basic care services, requires 136 
critical examination. This article examines the ways in which despite the hopeful discourse of 137 
early diagnosis, it has the potential to (re)produce patients’ fears and anxieties concerning the 138 
future as the prevailing biomedical model plays out in patient-practitioner encounters. Yet, 139 
the article also captures the conflicts and contradictions concerning early diagnosis inherent 140 
to practitioners’ accounts as they convey a sense of ambivalence: they simultaneously 141 
recognise the low expectations entangled in diagnosis and yet the ‘truth’ of cognitive decline 142 
is (re)produced, maintaining the dominant biomedical model for managing AD. Focussing in 143 
particular on the Science and Technology Studies (STS) literature on the sociology of ‘low’ 144 
expectations, this article examines the ways in which the hopeful future orientated discourse 145 
of early diagnosis is negotiated in the clinic and in doing so, highlights its affective 146 
dimensions: including hopelessness, uncertainty, anticipation and ambivalence. 147 
 148 
 149 
 150 
M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 7
 151 
Expectations and hope for the future 152 
 153 
Early diagnosis enacts a particular hopeful vision of a future with AD built on the notion that 154 
it will enable individuals to plan and prepare for a life with AD. The body of literature 155 
particularly helpful for conceptualising such ‘future orientated discourses’ (Gardner et al., 156 
2015: 1001) is the sociology of expectations. In particular work, which focuses on the less 157 
hopeful promissory orientations of the future; both the low and high expectations that 158 
accompany biomedical innovation projects (see Fitzgerald 2014; Gardner et al. 2015; 159 
Pickersgill 2011; Tutton 2011). This ‘intertwining of low and high expectations’ (Gardner et 160 
al., 2015: 1003), aligns with Moreira’s (2010) work on the ‘regime of truth’ and ‘regime of 161 
hope’ for making sense of early diagnosis. Focussing on memory clinic encounters, Moreira 162 
highlights how the regime of hope (treatment) and the regime of truth (diagnosis) enable 163 
patients and their families to make sense of early diagnosis. The regime of hope drives 164 
patients and family members to seek clinical advice and is emergent in patients’ and family 165 
members’ expectations of treatment options. The regime of truth is emergent within the 166 
results of standardised cognitive screening tools: the ‘truth’ of cognitive decline which both 167 
co-exist in the space of the clinic. Extending these claims, Moreira (2010) acknowledges that 168 
whilst the clinical world is ‘dominated by the truth of cognitive decline and the hope of a cure 169 
against it’, there are moments at which patients do not want to find definitive solutions in 170 
terms of a cure and treatment (pp. 132). Here, the regime of care emerges as memory loss 171 
becomes collectivised. It is neither concerned with identifying the cause of cognitive change 172 
and nor does it promise the hope that interventions may alter further change. According to 173 
Moreira (2010) a ‘regime of care’ is therefore central to making sense of early diagnosis in 174 
the memory clinic beyond the confines of the clinical framework. 175 
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 176 
In this article, I contribute to the analytical perspective of the sociology of expectations and 177 
the work of Moreira (2010) by drawing attention to the complex entanglements of hope and 178 
uncertainty in relation to the promissory claims of early diagnosis as the narrative of ‘truth’ 179 
and ‘hope’ prevails in the clinic. Developing this theoretical positioning however, this article 180 
demonstrates the emergence of conflicting visions of futures in practice as practitioners 181 
negotiate the consequences of the prevailing biomedical model in relation to its affective 182 
dimensions or ‘low’ expectations whilst simultaneously expressing their own sense of 183 
ambivalence. Practitioners account for and manage ambivalence as they negotiate the ‘truth’ 184 
and ‘hope’ or hopelessness entangled in early diagnosis. By problematising later onset AD 185 
through early diagnosis, policy makers and consequently practitioners, implicitly engage in 186 
the construction and constitution of patient expectations around a future with AD.  187 
 188 
Methods  189 
 190 
In this article, I draw upon data collected in two memory clinics and a hospital in a large 191 
teaching hospital trust in Yorkshire, UK. Data was collected over a one-year period and 192 
ethical approval was obtained from the relevant NHS Research Ethics Committee. Overall, 193 
this research was an ethnographic study exploring the role of cognitive screening tools in the 194 
process of diagnosing Alzheimer’s disease in the clinic. These tools included the 195 
Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination 111 and the Montreal Cognitive Assessment. In the 196 
out-patient memory clinics, I conducted observations in multi-disciplinary team (MDT) 197 
meetings with clinical professionals working across the fields of psychiatry and psychology, 198 
and observed initial assessment consultations with clinicians, patients and family members. 199 
As I was interested in the diagnosis process, I observed initial consultations where cognitive 200 
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screening tools were used with individuals experiencing memory problems: none of these 201 
participants had been given a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease. Practitioners identified 202 
patients suitable for participation and I attended out-patient clinics weekly to observe initial 203 
assessments. Alongside observations, in-depth interviews were carried out with 23 healthcare 204 
practitioners working in both the memory clinics and the hospital setting, including memory 205 
nurses, occupational therapists, consultant psychiatrists, psychologists and geriatricians. 206 
Practitioners were recruited via a gatekeeper in the out-patient setting and snowball sampling 207 
was adopted to gather a range of perspectives and levels of expertise. Informed consent to 208 
carry out observations of consultations was obtained from the healthcare practitioner, patient 209 
and family member(s). A separate process of consent was adopted to carry out interviews 210 
with healthcare practitioners and to observe practitioners in MDT meetings. The fieldwork 211 
sites emerge as spaces of interactions between different kinds of practitioners with different 212 
epistemic cultures.  213 
 214 
During interviews I focussed on the ways in which practitioners approached cognitive 215 
screening tools, their views on early diagnosis and how this may effect (and is effecting) 216 
patients and their families. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. 217 
Observations of consultations exploring how the complexities of diagnosis were negotiated in 218 
practice were recorded in handwritten notes and both interview transcripts and fieldnotes 219 
were analysed thematically. I analysed data manually to manage and make sense of emergent 220 
themes without becoming overwhelmed by quantity and scope. By adopting an ethnographic 221 
approach, I investigated how AD was ‘brought into being’ within a particular set of 222 
healthcare practices; revealing the ‘situated rationality of action’ (Murphy and Dingwall 223 
2007: 2224).  224 
 225 
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I begin the analysis by highlighting the ways in which particular discursive representations of 226 
Alzheimer’s disease emerge in the space of the clinic creating anxieties for patients and their 227 
families. The stigma attached to AD prevails which was witnessed across memory clinic 228 
encounters and confirmed across practitioners’ accounts as they discussed moments where 229 
patients resisted diagnosis, fearing a future confined to institutional care. As practitioners 230 
recounted, the affective consequences of diagnosis including fear and anxiety have the 231 
potential to be (re)produced by early diagnosis. Elucidating the low expectations or 232 
hopelessness around early diagnosis, I develop the analysis to capture practitioners’ internal 233 
conflicts concerning the benefit of early diagnosis for patients and their families. Practitioners 234 
struggle against feelings of ambivalence as they recognise that it enables patients and their 235 
families to prepare for the future and yet they are simultaneously concerned that it has the 236 
potential to cause futures filled with uncertainty and anticipation. This sense of ambivalence 237 
is complicated further as the prevailing model for managing AD has led to the underfunding 238 
of basic care resources in the UK. The article concludes by arguing that the tensions and 239 
contradictions inherent to practitioners’ accounts provide an important and significant 240 
perspective for troubling the dominant biomedical model for managing AD. It is not always 241 
beneficial for patients to ‘know’ since dominant perceptions of the ‘disease’ are framed 242 
primarily around loss of self, restricting the space for other meanings of memory loss to co-243 
exist, whilst care (non-biomedical intervention) is simultaneously undervalued and 244 
underfunded as a viable alternative for managing the disease. 245 
 246 
Knowing and its consequences 247 
 248 
Closing off futures - fearful anticipation 249 
 250 
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In the following section, I highlight the ways in which practitioners accounted for fear and 251 
anxiety entangled in diagnosis more generally. I then go on to capture how the fears and 252 
anxieties concerning diagnosis are in conflict with the hopeful promissory claims of early 253 
diagnosis. As accounted for by practitioners, the ‘truth’ of cognitive decline has the potential 254 
to (re)produce the uncertainties and anxieties that it aims to resolve, closing off and 255 
restricting the co-existence of other meanings and experiences of memory loss.  256 
 257 
For patients and their families, the prospect of Alzheimer’s disease overall, has the potential 258 
to create huge anxiety and fear, as it remains a stigmatised condition (see Beard 2013). As 259 
Consultant Psychiatrist 1 explains,  260 
 261 
‘There is still an awful lot of stigma in the population generally and amongst 262 
individuals as to the nature of it [AD], a lot of fear’ (Interview Consultant 263 
Psychiatrist 1).’   264 
 265 
Such fearful anticipation of AD given its stigmatisation and association with antiquated 266 
assumptions regarding madness and senility was witnessed during observations of 267 
consultations. Patients would often adopt the metaphor ‘doolally’ to account for their 268 
symptoms and concerns following assessment, and patients would thank practitioners for not 269 
laughing or apologising for how ‘stupid’ they considered themselves. Practitioners discussed 270 
and reflected on the negative discursive constructs entangled in diagnosis during team 271 
meetings, particularly in relation to the ways in which patients approached diagnostic 272 
appointments,  273 
 274 
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“‘A memory nurse presented the case of a patient who refused to attend an initial 275 
appointment for cognitive testing and who also refused to attend a scan 276 
appointment… a second memory nurse interrupted at this point and exclaimed that 277 
this was a regular occurrence, suggesting there is still a lot of negativity around the 278 
meaning of memory loss and its associations with dementia, which as she 279 
explained, ‘a lot of patients are fearful of and reject the terms’” (Observation Notes 280 
Team Meeting Nunmill Hospital). 281 
 282 
In this case, the patient’s refusal to attend assessment and diagnostic appointments was driven 283 
by the fearful anticipation around the meaning of diagnosis, of which there remains a great 284 
deal of negativity. As a result, the complexities entangled in the meaning of memory loss, 285 
dominated practitioners’ concerns across the memory clinics. They spoke frequently about 286 
the negativity foregrounding understandings of AD, built around particular assumptions 287 
concerning future loss of ‘self’.  288 
 289 
The fear and anticipation or hopeless expectations of AD were also related to patients’ 290 
conceptions of the nature of growing old and ageing ‘self’ (see Estes and Binney 1989). 291 
There is an intense classificatory struggle between how ageing is constructed as a success or 292 
failure, marked by decline in levels of cognitive function. Perhaps the ‘truth’ of cognitive 293 
decline in diagnosis produces and enacts ‘fear’ of stepping into the ‘community of otherness’ 294 
(Gilleard and Higgs 2013: 368); a state of becoming which lacks agency, choice and 295 
autonomy as Consultant Psychiatrist 1 suggests during interview, 296 
 297 
‘A lot of our patients will have had you know family members who historically would 298 
have had dementia when they’d have had a very potentially, very negative experience 299 
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of what it was like in the age of institutional care…so there’s still a reticence I think 300 
for people to come forward.’ 301 
 302 
At times, patients were unwilling to present with symptoms, in part because of the 303 
assumptions about dementia, which remain in existence across the population. Here, the 304 
consultant psychiatrist coded these assumptions in relation to archaic approaches towards the 305 
‘age of institutional care’ (re)producing and (re)enacting the ‘fear’ of a ‘community of 306 
otherness’ (Gilleard and Higgs 2013: 368). The fear of the ‘senile other’ or the symbolism of 307 
senility (Isaacs 1972) (related to dementia and old age more broadly) has the potential to 308 
drive the extent to which patients ‘come forward’ in the clinic, since the dominant perception 309 
of AD is built around ‘loss of self’. In this sense then the ‘regime of hope’ entangled in early 310 
diagnosis does not always drive patients to seek clinical advice (Moreira 2010). The 311 
hopelessness concerning the future ageing ‘self’ with AD had important implications for the 312 
ways in which patients engaged with diagnosis and accounted for their memory concerns. 313 
This was a point for reflection amongst all practitioners across the clinical teams; to push 314 
forward with diagnostic resolve, required acknowledgment of what testing cognition might 315 
mean for patients in the future. 316 
 317 
As these extracts elucidate, the process of diagnosis and assessment had the potential to 318 
intensify feelings of uncertainty and anxiety, which as I show, was complicated further by 319 
early diagnosis. Across the memory clinics, practitioners predominantly practised ‘wilful 320 
resistance’ to early diagnosis and the kinds of hopeful promissory claims it enacts, they 321 
considered earlier detection to intensify feelings of anxiety about living with AD into the 322 
future. As Consultant Psychiatrist 1 asked during interview, ‘are we just giving patients more 323 
years of anxiety?’ a sentiment echoed across epistemic cultures. Practitioners found 324 
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negotiating such anticipations and anxieties difficult, requiring a great deal of emotional work 325 
in the clinic as Trainee Psychiatrist 1 explains,  326 
 327 
‘There’s a real danger with early diagnosis…so not everybody wants a diagnosis: I 328 
had a case recently, a still on-going case that I’m seeing next week, of a gentleman in 329 
his early 70s used to be very, very high functioning, ran his own law firm and he came 330 
in; he had really bad cognitive decline. I’ve given them a diagnosis of dementia and 331 
him and his wife are just devastated…and yes that’s good for them to know about the 332 
you know and they did want a diagnosis, but after you’ve given them that diagnosis in 333 
the clinic they then go home and then they sit and they think. They’re you know 334 
they’re literally devastated by it and you wonder you know in this case actually maybe 335 
with a kind of a couple of years of not knowing that he definitely had dementia, it 336 
might have been good for them ‘cause he’s very frustrated now. He’s lashing out 337 
verbally at his wife ‘cause he’s so frustrated and worried about the future, and maybe 338 
that’s not always the best thing.’ 339 
 340 
In this case, Trainee Psychiatrist 1 reflects on the potential for early diagnosis to create 341 
further anxiety for both patients and their families. Whilst the formal classification of 342 
symptoms (the ‘truth’ of cognitive decline) may be helpful for individuals, it does not 343 
necessarily account for their experiences nor ease their anxieties or ‘low expectations’ 344 
concerning the future. Handling the information regarding diagnosis is therefore seen to 345 
require care given that the anticipation associated with it has important and at times adverse 346 
implications for patients and family members (Swallow 2016). Doing so requires 347 
acknowledging the implications of diagnosis within and beyond the space of the clinic, and 348 
for making sense of diagnosis day-to-day. In this sense a ‘regime of care’ (Moreira 2010) 349 
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which challenges the sensibilities of the ‘truth’ of the ‘clinical world’ (seen here with respect 350 
to a diagnostic label) may be useful for patients and their families. The patient’s frustrations 351 
and anxieties were intensified by the very act of diagnosis itself. Perhaps as Trainee 352 
Psychiatrist 1 suggests a ‘few years not knowing’ may protect patients from the reification of 353 
unwanted anxieties about the future, which the promissory claims of early diagnosis do not 354 
necessarily account for.  355 
 356 
What is interesting about Trainee Psychiatrist 1’s account here is that they recognise this 357 
particular patient’s desire to ‘know’ to make sense of their experiences through a diagnostic 358 
label and the uncertainties and anxieties instituted by this label. In doing so, they demonstrate 359 
their own internal conflict when faced with early diagnosis. At one level, there is the notion 360 
that ‘in the face of the fear of such a devastating condition [AD], and with such a possibility 361 
[early diagnosis], who could resist this hope’ (Rose 2009: 78) at the same time, practitioners 362 
contest the hopeful discourse around AD because it has the potential to ‘close off’ patient 363 
futures. Dealing with early diagnosis therefore requires practitioners to manage their own 364 
feelings of ambivalence as the following section will set out. Practitioners were concerned 365 
that the prevailing narrative of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ instituted by the biomedical model 366 
(re)produced patients’ low expectations and anxieties concerning the future as it restricts the 367 
space for other narratives of memory loss to co-exist beyond ‘loss of self’.  368 
 369 
Closing off futures: Practitioners’ sense of ambivalence 370 
 371 
Whilst practitioners grappled with the complexity of emotions in the clinic and the 372 
uncertainties and anxieties potentially (re)produced by early diagnosis, for all members of the 373 
clinical teams a diagnosis was also upheld for enabling patients to make practical decisions 374 
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about their future(s). As Consultant Psychiatrist 2 suggested during interview, ‘early 375 
diagnosis is so important so that you can allow people to make decisions about their future 376 
themselves’. Echoed further by Clinical Psychologist 1, ‘to make sense of their experiences, 377 
to plan and change things accordingly’ whilst ‘they still had capacity’ (Observation Notes 378 
MDT Nunmill Hospital). Whilst it is of course unsurprising that practitioners upheld the 379 
primacy of the diagnostic act since they are primarily trained to provide diagnosis and 380 
treatment, they also struggled against feelings of ambivalence about the consequences of 381 
privileging early diagnosis in the clinic. As a result, practitioners were not simply passive 382 
respondents to the privilege of the biomedical framework for managing AD (see Rose 2007). 383 
They recognised that early diagnosis is complex and should be approached with caution 384 
thereby demonstrating their own internal conflicts and contradictions concerning the benefits 385 
of early diagnosis. The following extracts from interviews with Memory Nurse 2 and 386 
Memory Nurse 3 capture this sense of ambivalence.  387 
 388 
“Well that’s a bit of a hornet’s nest, isn’t it? I suppose there’s two schools of thought 389 
and I’ve got a foot in each circle, which is a bit, I am sitting on the fence a bit really. I 390 
think because if people want to know because they’ve got memory problems and it’s 391 
impacting on their day to day life, yeah they need to know… they need to plan what to 392 
do, they need to be able to sort themselves …but then you see it and you think well 393 
you’re gonna have to live with this diagnosis for a long, long time…I don’t think 394 
everyone’s aware how emotional that’s gonna be for the person involved and their 395 
relatives… and I don’t think that this big drive really takes [that] into account” 396 
(Interview Memory Nurse 2). 397 
 398 
M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 17 
In ‘sitting on the fence’ Memory Nurse 2 establishes their sense of ambivalence. They 399 
acknowledge that individuals may find a diagnosis helpful to make sense of their experiences 400 
of memory loss ‘day-to-day’ and to make practical preparations for the future. Yet, in doing 401 
so it has the potential to efface the emotional and affective consequences of diagnosis. For 402 
Memory Nurse 2, early diagnosis has the potential to create a future filled with anxiety and 403 
uncertainty as individuals are required to live with knowing for longer. What is important 404 
here is that caring (c.f. Apesoa-Varano, Barker and Hinton 2011) is at the forefront of 405 
Memory Nurse 2’s articulations as they recognise the complexity of emotions entangled in 406 
diagnosis and its repercussions. In this sense, negotiating early diagnosis requires 407 
practitioners to have ‘a foot in each circle’, mindful of both its ability to emotionally impact 408 
patients given their ‘low expectations’ whilst also recognising that the ‘truth’ of cognitive 409 
decline may be helpful for some individuals. The internal conflicts felt by practitioners were 410 
evident across the memory service. The following extract from an interview with Memory 411 
Nurse 3 further elucidates this sense of ambivalence,  412 
 413 
“I’ve got mixed sort of feelings about it because sometimes when we go out and see 414 
our patients, a lot of our patients (this is where it kind of gets complicated) a lot of 415 
our patients don’t want that assessment”.  416 
 417 
For Memory Nurse 3, not all individuals seek a diagnostic label through formal assessment 418 
and this complicates early diagnosis. The notion of having ‘mixed feelings’ also alludes to the 419 
ways in which they may struggle with their own feelings of ambivalence. Whilst early 420 
diagnosis is promoted, they recognise that not all people make sense of memory loss through 421 
formal assessment. In this sense, early diagnosis has the potential to efface the co-existence 422 
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of other ways of dealing with symptoms and experiences of memory loss which was captured 423 
effectively during an interview with Clinical Psychologist 2, 424 
 425 
‘I wonder about the balance. What happens to all those people who have a diagnosis, 426 
and if there is such a value placed on them having a diagnosis, do we then lose sight 427 
of the individual at the centre of it; what it means for them to have that diagnosis, how 428 
they want that to be?’ (Interview Clinical Psychologist 2). 429 
 430 
What Clinical Psychologist 2 describes here, is the fact that shifting diagnosis towards earlier 431 
stages may not account for the ways in which patients construct meaning around diagnosis. It 432 
has the potential to restrict ways of approaching and making sense of memory loss, effacing 433 
the ‘individual’ and their experiences. The values associated with diagnosis and assessment 434 
overall, may not map onto the ways in which patients conceive the nature of diagnosis related 435 
to their own expectations and visions of ‘how they want to be’. For Clinical Psychologist 2, 436 
privileging diagnosis creates a situation of imbalance where patients’ experiences are 437 
undervalued in comparison to ways of measuring and diagnosing AD instituted by the 438 
biomedical model. The narrative of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ prevails in the clinic (c.f. Moreira 439 
2010). This was captured effectively during an interview with Clinical Psychologist 1,  440 
 441 
‘The downside of it all is that I think that’s something that people feel we can measure 442 
and value, and it’s something that doctors and psychologists can get involved with 443 
and label as an activity that they’re doing. Much the stuff about making the life of 444 
people with dementia worthwhile and improving their experience; it falls into the sort 445 
of much lower valued bracket of ‘care’, which as a society we undervalue. And so I 446 
think to a certain extent, there’s sort of a little bit of a conspiracy - not a sort of 447 
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conscious one - but or a collision of motivations, that’s created this. So we can set a 448 
target for it; we can measure it…it’s an industry... it’s much harder to describe, it’s 449 
much harder to price, it’s much harder to value…to do person-centered dementia 450 
care that actually improves people’s lives (Interview Clinical Psychologist 1).’  451 
 452 
In this case, the culture of practising early diagnosis is entangled in efforts to improve and 453 
govern diagnosis rates through formal surveillance and measurement targets, which 454 
contribute to a healthcare economy. The narrative of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ therefore prevails 455 
resulting in a ‘collision of motivations’ despite practitioners raising concerns about the 456 
undervaluing of care work. The lack of value associated with such work is perpetuated by the 457 
increasing demands to rationalise, legitimise and measure clinical work, which maintains the 458 
dominant biomedical model despite the ambivalence conveyed by practitioners. In this sense, 459 
for a number of practitioners, patients’ experiences are undervalued in these discussions. For 460 
Clinical Psychologist 1, early diagnosis is embedded in the wider institution of the healthcare 461 
economy as ’industry’, which has important implications for patients. As these extracts show, 462 
early diagnosis has the ability to constrain the affective and perhaps invisible labour, which is 463 
continually at work in the clinic. Thus far, this is seen with respect to the ways in which 464 
practitioners account for the anxieties felt by patients and their families and the undervaluing 465 
of care work. 466 
 467 
In this section, I have examined the ways in which early diagnosis has the potential to 468 
(re)produce uncertainties and anxieties around patient futures; restricting ways of managing 469 
individuals’ experiences beyond the confines of the biomedical and clinical framework. Yet, 470 
in dealing with the affective consequences of diagnosis in the clinic and patients’ low 471 
expectations, a number of actors within the memory service convey a sense of ambivalence. 472 
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Whilst they recognise that it allows patients to prepare for their future and thereby uphold the 473 
primacy of the diagnostic act, they also express their own concerns regarding early diagnosis. 474 
They account for the ways in which the prevailing narrative of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ has led to 475 
what Clinical Psychologist 1 describes as a ‘collision of motivations’ that maintains the 476 
dominance of the biomedical model despite the ambivalence felt by providers. This sense of 477 
ambivalence as a further affective dimension of early diagnosis is a significant development 478 
in the ‘cure versus care debate’ for understanding how practitioners make sense of the 479 
complexities associated with early diagnosis and its repercussions. As the final section of the 480 
article will show, the underfunding of basic care resources due to the privileging of diagnosis, 481 
further complicates the tensions and contradictions inherent to practitioners’ accounts.  482 
 483 
Closing off futures: Care as material resource and capturing the ‘bigger picture’ 484 
 485 
Across memory clinics, practitioners expressed their concerns for the increased demand on 486 
the healthcare service and underfunding of resources as Consultant Psychiatrist 3 explains,  487 
 488 
‘I think referral numbers from what I understand are going up, and are likely to 489 
continue going up. As well, the resources with the economy, the resources are going 490 
down as well, particularly with social care as well. So it’s going to mean a lot more 491 
demand on the one, the service’. 492 
 493 
‘So I think it’s going to be a lot more emphasis on diagnosis, but then less support 494 
afterwards with social care budgets being reduced…so it’s a concern’.  495 
 496 
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Here, the prevailing narrative of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ creates a situation of imbalance with 497 
respect to care. For Consultant Psychiatrist 3, the underfunding of social care in the UK is a 498 
direct repercussion of the privileging of early diagnosis. This was clarified further by 499 
Registrar Geriatrician 1, 500 
 501 
‘You have to look at the bigger picture…what kind of care are we offering these 502 
patients in terms of diagnosis and treatment…what other social care do we give to 503 
these patients? And I think that that’s been in decline recently as well…and actually 504 
perhaps that’s what we need to be improving, is that bigger picture of improving 505 
assessment, diagnosis, treatment and like care and support in the community.’  506 
 507 
Dominating practitioners’ accounts across the memory clinics were concerns regarding care 508 
as Lock (2013) has also highlighted. For Registrar Geriatrician 1, care as material resource 509 
(non-biomedical intervention), is central to imagining ways of managing AD beyond 510 
Moreira’s (2010) conceptualisations of the regimes of both truth (diagnosis) and hope 511 
(treatment options). Since diagnosis is privileged both within the clinic and more broadly in 512 
terms of resources, this creates particular uncertainties around patient futures, which 513 
paradoxically, it is expected to handle and sort. For Registrar Geriatrician 1, the ‘bigger 514 
picture’ is crucial for making sense of memory loss beyond the diagnostic act and more 515 
broadly in terms of resources.  516 
 517 
The consequences of a lack of social care or support post-diagnosis for the future of 518 
healthcare practice requires further critical examination. This is particularly important as 519 
healthcare commissioners may also project their uncertainty for early diagnosis and yet 520 
continue to privilege the biomedical approach for making sense of AD. As Clinical 521 
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Psychologist 1 explains when describing the tensions which arise during local commissioning 522 
meetings,  523 
 524 
‘The prevailing sort of narrative is still: if we can’t give them medicine then what’s 525 
the point. If we can’t cure it what’s the point. There is still a lot - still around - 526 
certainly I’ve sat in commissioning meetings with GP commissioners saying, ‘remind 527 
me again what’s the point of early diagnosis?’ 528 
As Clinical Psychologist 1 explains, commissioners may also project their own anticipations 529 
concerning early diagnosis. In this case however, despite articulating their concerns the 530 
narrative of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ prevails: a cure and treatment options remain central to ways 531 
of explaining, approaching and managing AD despite the ambivalence conveyed by a number 532 
of providers. Given commissioners’ concerns, the value ascribed to care as a viable 533 
alternative for managing AD, is an important avenue for further critical examination.  534 
 535 
For Alzheimer’s disease, detection at earlier stages as a means to manage the risks associated 536 
with an ‘ageing population’ does not necessarily mean that it ‘change[s] patients’ ultimate 537 
prognosis’ (Aronowitz 2009: 423). As a result, early diagnosis has the potential to create 538 
uncertainties and anxieties around patient futures particularly as the biomedical model 539 
undervalues the role of care as entanglements of both material resource and emotional labour 540 
in the management of AD. Shifting the diagnostic act towards earlier stages instituted 541 
particular conflicting representations and expectations of the future, which had important 542 
implications for the ways in which different actors in the memory service approached early 543 
diagnosis. The significance of this analysis as it engages with the complexities of the care 544 
versus care debate, is that it demonstrates practitioners’ articulations of ambivalence. 545 
Negotiating early diagnosis is therefore a complex endeavour as different actors recognise the 546 
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low expectations produced by the prevailing biomedical model and yet, it remains the 547 
dominant framework for managing AD. This article has subsequently highlighted the 548 
tensions, contradictions and complexities inherent to practising early diagnosis as 549 
practitioners attempt to make sense of the prevailing biomedical model with its potential to 550 
‘close off’ hopeful visions of the future.  551 
 552 
 553 
 554 
Conclusion 555 
 556 
This article brings to bear the concerns raised by practitioners with respect to early diagnosis; 557 
casting light on the anticipations and anxieties the future of an ageing population with AD 558 
produces. The prevailing narrative of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ instituted by early diagnosis has the 559 
potential to bring forth conflicting hopeless visions of the future in two ways and in doing so, 560 
demonstrating the vulnerabilities of hope and optimism. Firstly, it enacts a vision of the 561 
future filled with uncertainty and anxiety since it restricts patients’ experiences of memory 562 
loss beyond conceptualisations of loss of ‘self’. Secondly, it enacts a vision of the future 563 
through which the promissory claims of early diagnosis are difficult to imagine. This is due 564 
primarily to a lack of care as material resource given the challenges facing the NHS. Overall, 565 
as the regimes of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ prevail and the closure of the diagnostic act in the 566 
‘clinical world’ of AD is privileged, this constrains the invisible, affective dimensions and 567 
tensions accounted for by practitioners across clinical practice.   568 
 569 
As this article has shown, the hopeful promissory claims of early diagnosis efface the 570 
expectations, anticipations and anxieties that such work might (re)produce and perform in the 571 
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clinic. Therefore stressing of the good associated with early diagnosis, becomes implicit in 572 
‘downplaying’ the more ‘tangential’, invisible and affective consequences of promoting early 573 
diagnosis, which is uncertain and complex (Michael 2000: 30). Although this uncertainty is 574 
not necessarily a point unique to AD, practitioners attest that given the difficulty in 575 
determining a treatment or cure for AD, care as an alternative and viable option for managing 576 
the disease, is often overlooked within the prevailing (bio)medical model. Practitioners iterate 577 
that early diagnosis closes off ‘care into the future’, both in terms of the work involved in 578 
handling a diagnosis, and also in terms of resources. Despite the prevailing (bio)medical 579 
model through which AD is positioned, the consequences of the underfunding of social care 580 
in the UK as early diagnosis is privileged in research and policy, is often at the core of 581 
practitioners’ concerns. Not only does early diagnosis therefore have the potential to 582 
(re)produce the anxieties and anticipations about the future with AD for patients, it also 583 
creates anxieties for practitioners.  584 
Yet, this article has not only dealt with the repercussions of the prevailing biomedical model 585 
for managing AD entangled within a wider discussion of the cure versus care debate, it has 586 
also captured the tensions and contradictions inherent to practising early diagnosis. Whilst a 587 
number of practitioners attest that diagnosis may enable patients to ‘prepare for their future’ 588 
they simultaneously recognise that a diagnosis has affective and emotional consequences 589 
which may be difficult to negotiate. Dealing with early diagnosis therefore requires 590 
practitioners to manage their own feelings of ambivalence. Practitioners themselves struggle 591 
to deal with the benefits of early diagnosis given its ambiguity; it has the potential to create a 592 
future filled with uncertainty and anxiety as it restricts the co-existence of other meanings of 593 
memory loss beyond ‘loss of self’, and reinforces the construction that ‘cognition is the 594 
decisive carrier of personhood’ (Leibing 2006: 258). In capturing the ways in which 595 
practitioners experience the ambiguity around early diagnosis and in turn convey their sense 596 
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of ambivalence, this article draws together the consequences of the cure versus care debate in 597 
relation to its affective dimensions or ‘low’ expectations. This is significant in that it 598 
addresses the gap in the literature which pertains to the ways in which practitioners negotiate 599 
the complexities of emotions or low expectations in the clinic regarding a future with AD, 600 
whilst simultaneously expressing their own feelings of ambivalence. 601 
 602 
Yet, despite practitioners accounting for the low expectations enacted by early diagnosis and 603 
in doing so dealing with their own sense of ambivalence, the dominance of the biomedical 604 
model with respect to diagnosis is maintained and (re)produced. To negotiate this the trainee 605 
psychiatrist suggested that it may be useful to protect patients by giving them a ‘few years not 606 
knowing’, yet in practice, practitioners are constrained by the drive in healthcare policy to 607 
diagnose AD at earlier stages through pay-for-performance schemes such as those outlined in 608 
the introduction. Further research could examine the impact of these initiatives on the 609 
affective dimensions of early diagnosis and the ways in which the biomedical model is 610 
continually upheld and privileged despite practitioners constructing (temporary) articulations 611 
of care (Apesoa-Varona, Barker and Hinton 2011).  612 
 613 
The sense of ambivalence conveyed by practitioners as they negotiate the narrative of ‘truth’ 614 
and ‘hope’ as described by Moreira (2010) is previously unaccounted for in literature, which 615 
critically engages with the complexities of the cure versus care debate. Such ambivalence 616 
also creates a space in which stakeholders may need to contemplate and debate the 617 
privileging of early diagnosis: practitioners are not simply passive respondents to the 618 
processes of (bio)medicalisation which circulate across practitioner-patient encounters. In this 619 
sense, further research is also required to account for patients’ and family members’ 620 
experiences and articulations of early diagnosis particularly with respect to the challenges 621 
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facing the NHS and the underfunding of social care in the UK. Overall, this article hopes to 622 
offer a brief insight into early diagnosis as it shifts the overlooked expectations of patients 623 
and concerns of practitioners; producing anxieties and uncertainties that it is expected to 624 
resolve. In privileging the biomedical model for framing and making sense of AD, 625 
policymakers should pay due attention to the affective labour at work, and the complexities 626 
of a healthcare system through which diagnosis is privileged and care underfunded. In doing 627 
so, encouraging an everyday sensibility to managing the ambiguities of AD than the 628 
privileging of early diagnosis allows in the space of the clinic.  629 
 630 
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